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MEET THE NEW JUVENILE AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS 
DISTRICT COURT 
Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Without trumpet or even modest fanfare, the 1981 Virginia Gen-
eral Assembly passed two new subsections to Title 16.1 of the Code 
of Virginia, amending the jurisdiction of the juvenile and domestic 
relations district courts (hereinafter cited as J & DR). Despite 
their uncontroversial passage, they portend significant changes for 
the J & DR court and the circuit court as well, and have generated 
surprise and bewilderment among the J & DR court judges.1 This 
article explores the meaning of the amendments and their long-
term implications. 
II. THE AMENDMENTS 
The amendments provide that the J & DR district courts shall 
have exclusive jurisdiction over all proceedings involving "[a]ny 
person who seeks spousal support after having separated from his 
or her spouse. "2 The parallel dispositional provision states that 
"[i]n cases involving a spouse who seeks spousal support after hav-
ing separated from his or her spouse, the court may enter any ap-
propriate order to protect the welfare of the spouse seeking sup-
port."3 This fundamentally alters the jurisdiction and work of the 
J & DR court, authorizing its intrusion into the hitherto sacrosanct 
domain of the circuit court. In fact, these amendments may re-
present the first, albeit unwitting, step toward a true family law 
court in Virginia. 
A. Do the Amendments Establish a New Right? 
Virginia traditionally has denied support to a spouse guilty of 
• Assistant Professor of Law, College of William and Mary; B.A., Barnard College, 1968; 
J.D., College of William and Mary, 1976. 
1. The fall 1981 district court judges' conference devoted a full morning session to these 
amendments. The Honorable Richard Jamborsky of the 19th Judicial Circuit and this au-
thor led the discussion. 
2. VA. CoDE ANN. § 16.1-24l(L) (Cum. Supp. 1981). 
3. VA. CoDE ANN. § 16.1-279{M) (Cum. Supp. 1981). 
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marital fault;' Read literally, the new amendments empower the J 
& DR court to enter any appropriate spousal support award to any 
separated spouse whose welfare requires protection. The new pro-
visions do not mention marital fault, a pivotal issue in circuit court 
proceedings considering support.15 Because they do not mention 
marital fault, they could be interpreted as establishing a new sub-
stantive right, namely, a spouse's right, regardless of marital fault, 
to seek support after separation if his or her welfare requires it. 
Although this interpretation is possible, it is improbable. For one 
thing, noise and flurry generally accompany the creation of a new 
substantive right. These amendments crept in quietly, hardly a 
likely entry for a new right, especially one so radically different 
from that which existed before. Presumably, if the amendments 
were intended as a revolutionary departure from prior law, they 
would have sparked some controversy. Yet there was no apparent 
controversy surrounding their enactment. Furthermore, if the 
amendments do authorize a right to support regardless of fault, 
they would produce an anomalous situation. The General Assem-
bly did not amend section 20-107, the statutory provision delineat-
ing circuit court powers with respect to civil support, and section 
20-107 explicitly precludes the possibility of support for a spouse 
guilty of marital fault. 6 It would be incongruous to assume that the 
General Assembly intended fault to be determinative in circuit 
court, the traditional arena for pitched support battles, and irrele-
vant in J & DR court. In short, it seems most reasonable and prob-
able to conclude that the amendments do not create a new sub-
stantive right cognizant in J & DR court.7 
The sponsor of the bill giving rise to the amendments stated 
that they did not.8 Delegate Clinton Miller stated that he proposed 
4. See, e.g., House v. House, 102 Va. 235, 46 S.E. 299 (1904); Harris v. Harris, 72 Va. (31 
Gratt.) 13 (1878); A. PHELPS, DIVORCE AND ALIMONY IN VIRGINIA AND WEST VIRGINIA§ 11-3 
(2d ed. 1963). In this, Virginia followed the English common law approach. 1 BLACKSTONE, 
CoMMENTARIES 429 (1st ed. 1765, reprinted 1966) (where wife was at fault, she was not enti-
tled to alimony). 
5. VA. CoDE ANN. § 20-107 (Cum. Supp. 1981) provides that'"' ... no permanent sup-
port and maintenance • . • for the spouse shall be awarded • . . from a spouse if there exists 
in his or her favor a ground of divorce .•.• " 
6. VA. CoDE ANN. § 20-107 (Cum. Supp. 1981). 
7. Undoubtedly, some enterprising attorney will argue for the improbable interpretation. 
The broad, vague language of the amendments invites it. And, of course, some J & DR court 
may find the improbable quite likely. 
8. Delegate Clinton Miller from the Shenandoah Valley sponsored the bill, HB 1757. Both 
Judge Jamborsky and the author spoke independently with Mr. Miller about these amend-
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the bill to obviate a spouse's need to go to circuit court for support 
when that spouse was already litigating other matters in J & DR 
court. Delegate Miller noted that the bill was intended to give the 
J & DR court concurrent jurisdiction over civil support. It simply 
authorizes the J & DR court to award support comparable to that 
already available in circuit court. No new substantive right was in-
tended, no major change was contemplated. He also said that the 
Legislature had no intention of conferring exclusive original juris-
diction on the J & DR court. Of course, as Lord Mildew once said, 
"[i]f Parliament does not mean what it says it must say so.''9 Al-
though it is helpful to know the legislative intentions and motiva-
tions behind these amendments, legislative history as such does 
not exist in Virginia. The statutory language alone provides the 
basis for interpretation. Section 16.1-241 provides that the J & DR 
courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over these new pro-
ceedings and neither subsection makes any reference to marital 
fault.10 Absent further legislative action, the ultimate meaning of 
these new amendments rests with the Virginia Supreme Court. At 
this moment, only two things are clear: whatever the new proceed-
ings entail, they must be brought initially in J & DR court, and 
they can only be brought after the spouses' separation. 
B. If the Amendments Do Not Establish a New Right, What Do 
They Mean? 
Assuming that the amendments do not establish a new right, it 
is necessary to ask what existing right is now available in J & DR 
court. The support right in question must relate to civil support 
because the J & DR court already had exclusive original jurisdic-
tion over criminal support proceedings.11 The "old" right to civil 
support, newly available in J & DR court, cannot arise from juris-
ments. He proposed the bill in response to a complaint he received from two local attorneys. 
They were representing a wife in J & DR court and had requested support for her. The J & 
DR court refused to entertain the support petition holding that it did not have jurisdiction 
to award civil support. 
9. Bluff v. Father Gray, A. HERBERT, THE UNCOMMON LAw 313 (1935). 
10. VA. CoDE ANN.§§ 16.1-241(L) to 279(M) (Cum. Supp. 1981). 
11. VA. CODE ANN.§ 20-61 (Cum. Supp. 1981) makes a misdemeanor the willful, unjustifi-
able refusal to provide support for a spouse in necessitous circumstances. VA. CODE ANN. § 
20-72 (Repl. Vol. 1975) authorizes the J & DR court to enter a support award against the 
defendant spouse in lieu of or in addition to the criminal penalties. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-67 
(Repl. Vol. 1975) gives the J & DR courts exclusive original jurisdiction over such proceed-
ings. If the amendments related to criminal support proceedings, they would be superfluous. 
To be meaningful, they must relate to civil support. 
790 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:787 
diction to adjudicate the parties' marital status. The new amend-
ments do not give the J & DR court power to annul, affirm or dis-
solve the marriage and according to section 20-96, the circuit court 
has exclusive jurisdiction over such suits.12 Therefore, by a process 
of elimination, these amendments must involve a right to civil sup-
port which exists independently of a divorce, annulment or affir-
mation proceeding. In Virginia, there is only one such existing 
right to civil support. It is the common law right to separate main-
tenance. Historically, a wife, independently of a suit for divorce, 
could seek support from her husband by instituting a bill for sepa-
rate maintenance.13 Reasoning from these facts, the amendments 
seem to give the J & DR courts exclusive original jurisdiction over 
separate maintenance suits. 
C. Ramifications of Expanded Jurisdiction 
By vesting the J & DR court with exclusive original jurisdiction 
over separate maintenance, the amendments take away a signifi-
cant, long-standing power of ~he circuit court. They fundamentally 
alter the traditional balance of power and operational spheres of 
the two courts. Jurisdiction to award separate maintenance entails 
jurisdiction to determine marital fault. A long line of Virginia cases 
establishes that a wife is entitled to separate maintenance only if 
she lives separate and apart from her husband, without fault on 
her part.14 As early as 1810, the Virginia Supreme Court said that 
a wife was entitled to "alimony" only "if without any impropriety 
of behavior on her part, he [the husband] had separated himself 
from her without affording to her any support."15 In Virginia, free-
dom from marital fault is the touchstone of any separate mainte-
nance action. Thus, if the amendments confer separate mainte-
12. VA. ConE ANN. § 20-96 (Cum. Supp. 1981) states in pertinent part: "The circuit court, 
on the chancery side thereof, shall have jurisdiction of suits for annulling or affirming mar-
riages and for divorces." 
13. See, e.g., White v. White, 181 Va. 162, 24 S.E.2d 448 (1943) (alimony is not a mere 
incident of divorce but instead an independent substantive right); Heflin v. Heflin, 177 Va. 
385, 14 S.E.2d 317 (1941) (Virginia divorce and non-support statutes have not abridged the 
jurisdiction of equity courtS in suits for separate maintenance); Jolliffe v. Jolliffe, 10 Va. 
Law Reg. 1098 (1905) (equitable jurisdiction to award alimony exists independently of di-
vorce: court can award it even if there is no prayer for divorce and no jurisdiction to grant a 
divorce); Williams v. Williams, 188 Va. 543, 50 S.E.2d 277 (1948); see also Purcell v. Purcell, 
14 Va. (4 Hen. & M.) 507 (1810). See also, A. PHELPs, supra note 5, at § 12-1. 
14. See, e.g., Aichner v. Aichner, 215 Va. 624, 212 S.E.2d 278 (1975); Montgomery v. 
Montgomery, 183 Va. 96,31 S.E.2d 284 (1944); Hendry v. Hendry, 172 Va. 368, 1 S.E.2d 340 
(1939). See also, A. PHELPS, supra note 5, at § 12-2. 
15. Purcell v. Purcell, 14 Va. (4 Hen. & M.) 507, 507-013 (1810). 
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nance jurisdiction on the J & DR court, 16 they ipso facto give the J 
& DR court jurisdiction to determine marital fault. Once the exclu-
sive preserve of the circuit court, now the whole body of common 
law relating to marital fault will apply in J & DR court, although 
detached from its traditional mooring, the divorce proceeding. In-
directly, the amendments involve the J & DR court in all of the 
statutory grounds for divorce and the permitted common law de-
fenses of condonation, connivance, collusion, recrimination, the ab-
sence of corroboration, etc. In effect, the amendments blur the two 
courts' traditionally distinct legal domains. Both courts now are 
authorized to determine two of the most significant aspects of the 
"domestic relation," fault and support. 
A J & DR court determination under these amendments could 
bind the circuit court. A right of de novo appeal does exist from J 
& DR court to circuit court/7 however, if no appeal were taken, a J 
& DR court finding of fault would bind the circuit court under 
traditional legal principles.18 Unappealed, a J & DR court determi-
nation of fault would preclude a later circuit court inquiry into 
fault for purposes of either support or divorce. The amendments, 
therefore, significantly expand the breadth and depth of J & DR 
court involvement in domestic relations. They indirectly sanction J 
& DR court encroachment upon the circuit court's once hallowed 
and exclusive authority to determine marital fault and to award or 
deny a fault divorce. Clearly, the amendments have potentially far-
reaching consequences for the J & DR court, the circuit court and 
the balance of judicial power with respect to domestic relations 
matters. In the absence of an appeal, the J & DR court could for-
ever establish or preclude a spouse's right to support; it could es-
tablish or preclude a spouse's ability to obtain a fault divorce in 
circuit court. 
The potentially enhanced significance of J & DR court determi-
16. At common law, the wife alone had a right to seek separate maintenance because only 
the husband owed a duty of support. H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 14.1 (1968). 
The amendments speak of "spouse" not wife. Strictly speaking, then, they are not cotermi-
nous with separate maintenance. They are broader. This no doubt reflects the General As-
sembly's attempts since 1975 to make Virginia's laws sexually neutral. It also follows the 
mandate established by the United States Supreme Court in Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979). 
17. VA. ConE ANN. §§ 16.1-106, -113 (Cum. Supp. 1981). 
18. The traditional legal principle would be "estoppel by judgment" rather than res judi-
cata. A suit for separate maintenance would be a different cause of action from a divorce 
suit even though the parties would be the same. Therefore, res judicata would not apply. As 
to issues actually litigated and determined in the original action, however, estoppel by judg-
ment would preclude their relitigation. A. PHELPs, supra note 5, at § 15-5. 
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nations may affect the J & DR court's actual daily operations. Par-
ties can and frequently do appear without counsel in J & DR 
court. In a proceeding under these amendments, parties would be 
ill-advised to do so because of the potentially high stakes and com-
plex issues. So too, as a "court not of record," the J & DR court 
hitherto has not created a written record of its proceedings. Since, 
under this proceeding, its determination may be binding, the J & 
DR court should give a written opinion. In terms of practical con-
sequences, these amendments push the J & DR court closer to 
"full courthood" status. The actual proceedings in J & DR court 
may be indistinguishable from proceedings in circuit court, thereby 
further blurring the historic lines of demarcation between the two. 
Only two distinctions remain to differentiate the two courts: the 
circuit court retains exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate the parties' 
marital status, and it has the power to vitiate the work of the J & 
DR court if a de novo appeal is taken. 
III. THE NEw J & DR CouRT-PROPOSALS TO FINISH THE JoB 
' 
Regardless of interpretation, the 1981 amendments seem clearly 
intended to promote judicial economy. To achieve this laudable 
purpose, however, further steps are necessary and appropriate to 
help clear up the confusion they have generated. 
A. The Legislature Should Confer Divorce Jurisdiction on the J 
& DR Court 
Under the 1981 amendments, the J & DR court can adjudicate 
marital fault. In short, at this moment, the J & DR court has the 
power to do everything but grant a divorce. In light of its existing 
powers, it seems irrational, in fact, uncommonly silly, to deny it 
divorce jurisdiction. By its own enactments, the Legislature has 
recognized J & DR court competence to adjudicate all of the rele-
vant, important domestic relations issues. Having gone this far, the 
Legislature should consider completing the job, and confer divorce 
jurisdiction on the J & DR court. 
In addition to satisfying the superficial issue that a court's name 
should accurately portray its function, it would make logical and 
economical sense to have a single court which specialized in all as-
pects of domestic relations. J & DR court jurisdiction over all do-
mestic relations questions would free the circuit court to consider 
other matters. In addition, it would eliminate some of the shufHing 
between the two courts. There is no apparent reason for not giving 
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divorce jurisdiction to the J & DR court. In enacting section 20-79, 
the Legislature tacitly acknowledged that J & DR courts were bet-
ter suited to enforce domestic relations decrees regarding custody, 
support and maintenance.19 Section 20-79(c) currently empowers 
the J & DR court to make initial determinations of support and 
custody20 under some circumstances. It also authorizes the J & DR 
court to modify a prior circuit court decree.21 
At one time, perhaps, it made sense to deny divorce jurisdiction 
to the J & DR court. That time, however, has passed. In 1973, Vir-
ginia reorganized and reformed its district courts.22 As a result, 
full-time judges with legal training now preside over each court. 
The J & DR courts now are fully competent to handle divorce ju-
risdiction. Such jurisdiction would benefit the citizens of Virginia. 
It would provide spouses with access to an expert, inexpensive fo-
rum which could provide complete relief.23 Circuit court involve-
ment is no longer inherently necessary. J & DR court jurisdiction 
is eminently rational. 
B. De Novo Review to the Circuit Court Should Be Eliminated 
De novo review from J & DR court to circuit court also is not 
necessary. Although no one seriously would question the need for 
appellate review, the issue of de novo review is controversial. Fre-
quently it makes J & DR court proceedings a dress rehearsal. It 
causes tremendous duplication of judicial time and energies. It 
lowers the self-esteem of J & DR court judges. Their hard work 
and serious deliberations become worthless if an appeal is noted.24 
The new amendments accentuate the problems created by de novo 
review. Unlike custody which, at the petitioner's election, can be 
brought in circuit court and unlike divorce which must be brought 
19. VA. CODE ANN. § 20·79(c) (Cum. Supp. 1981) authorizes the circuit court to transfer 
its orders for support and custody to the J & DR court for enforcement. The Virginia Su-
preme Court interpreted § 20·79(c) as an overt recognition of the J & DR court's supervi-
sory and enforcement abilities. Werner v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 623, 186 S.E.2d 76 
(1972). 
20. VA. CoDE ANN. § 20-79(c) (Cum. Supp. 1981). 
21. Id. 
22. CoMMONWEALTH OF VmGINlA STATE OF THE JUDICIARY REPORT (1980) (annual address 
by Virginia Supreme Court Chief Justice !'Anson). 
23. Court filing fees as well as attorney's fees are considerably lower for J & DR court 
than circuit court. 
24. "The judgment of the trial justice is completely annulled by the appeal and is not 
thereafter effective for any purpose." Addison v. Salyer, 185 Va. 644, 650, 40 S.E.2d 260, 263 
(1946). 
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in circuit court, all suits for separate maintenance must be brought 
initially in J & DR court. 25 Because the amendments require that 
everyone go there, and the stakes are potentially high, many liti-
gants will appeal; the work of the J & DR court will be undone. 
These amendments verily multiply the potential duplication of 
time and effort inherent in de novo review. 
The problem of duplication of effort with respect to separate 
maintenance actions has more than academic importance. Separate 
maintenance actions are not a remembrance of things past. The 
Virginia Supreme Court recently has recognized the critical impor-
tance of separate maintenance as a support tool. 26 In an ex parte 
foreign divorce situation, a Virginia spouse can protect and enforce 
his or her support rights only through the vehicle of separate 
maintenance.27 In addition, 1981 amendments to Virginia's long-
arm statute26 portend that an increasing number of separate main-
tenance actions will be brought in Virginia. Separate maintenance 
actions are an important, vital aspect of Virginia domestic rela-
tions law. Under the section 16.1 amendments, the authority, in-
volvement and work load of the J & DR court in domestic relations 
matters will increase substantially. Paradoxically, because of de 
novo review, the circuit court's power to nullify that work will in-
crease concomitantly. 
C. The Authority of the New J & DR Court Should be More 
Clearly Delineated 
The amendments fail to delineate the court's exact authority. 
They do not mention the court's ability to modify an existing order 
in light of changed circumstances, nor do they discuss the effects 
on an original order of an obligor or obligee's death or the obligee's 
remarriage. They do not address the effect of a separation agree-
ment upon the court's authority to enter a separate maintenance 
award. In each of those situations, statutory provisions limit circuit 
25. VA. CoDE ANN. § 16.1-241 (Cum. Supp. 1981). The provision on jurisdiction provides 
in pertinent part: "Except as hereinafter provided, each juvenile and domestic relations dis-
trict court shall have, within the limits of the territory for which it is created, exclusive 
original jurisdiction • . . over all cases, matters and proceedings involving • • . ." 
26. Newport v. Newport, 219 Va. 48, 245 S.E.2d 134 (1978). See also A. PHELPS, supra 
note 5, at § 12-1. 
27. See Hosier v. Hosier, 221 Va. 827, 273 S.E.2d 564 (1981); Newport v. Newport, 219 
Va. 48, 245 S.E.2d 134 (1978); Osborne v. Osborne, 215 Va. 205, 207 S.E.2d 875 (1974). 
28. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1(9) (Cum. Supp. 1981). 
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court jurisdiction. 29 In the interests of symmetry, consistency and 
social policy, the existing limitations on circuit court jurisdiction 
should apply to the J & DR court. If they do not, 30 case law on 
separate maintenance may serve the same function. The Virginia 
Supreme Court stated in dictum that separate maintenance awards 
were fluid and subject to modification. "The right of the wife dur-
ing coverture to support and maintenance ... is uncertain in du-
ration, lasting possibly a day, a month, or a year or more. It ceases 
entirely upon the death of either husband or wife. "31 Whether by 
statute or case law the existing restrictions on circuit court power 
should govern the J & DR court to avoid serious and socially objec-
tionable discrepancies. 
The amendments creat-e another curious problem. Prior to the 
amendments, the circuit court could entertain a bill for divorce 
and a cross-bill for separate maintenance. In fact, the Virginia Su-
preme Court encouraged such economy of law suits. 32 Under the 
amendments, that is no longer possible. Even though section 20-
107 still authorizes the circuit court to award support in the event 
a divorce is not granted, 33 its award cannot be denominated sepa-
rate maintenance because any request for separate maintenance 
must be made initially in J & DR court. If the J & DR court ac-
quired separate maintenance jurisdiction before the circuit court 
acquired divorce jurisdiction, the J & DR court would be entitled 
to complete its deliberations. 34 If no appeal were taken, the J & 
DR court determination of fault would bind the circuit court. If an 
appeal were taken, the circuit court would have to relitigate the 
separate maintenance action. It could entertain the divorce action 
only after resolution of the separate maintenance question. Thus, 
at a minimum two and at a maximum three law suits would be 
required, where before one would have sufficed. Because separate 
maintenance is a transitory action, 35 the domicile and residency re-
29. See VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 20-109, -107 (Cum. Supp. 1981). 
30. The statutory provisions circumscribing the circuit court's support power may not 
apply to its separate maintenance powers because separate maintenance is a non-statutory, 
equitable right. Montgomery v. Montgomery, 183 Va. 96, 315 S.E.2d 284 (1944); Heflin v. 
Heflin, 177 Va. 385, 14 S.E.2d 317 (1941); contra, A. PHELPS, supra note 5, § 12-12. 
31. Eaton v. Davis, 176 Va. 330, 340, 10 S.E.2d 893, 898 (1940) (dictum). 
32. Brewer v. Brewer, 199 Va. 626, 101 S.E.2d 516 (1958). 
33. VA. CoDE ANN. § 20-107 (Cum. Supp. 1981). 
34. Westfall v. Westfall, 196 Va. 97, 82 S.E.2d 487 (1954). See A. PHELPS, supra note 5, at 
§ 12-2. 
35. Goodwine v. Sup. Ct. of Los Angeles, 63 Cal. 2d 481, 407 P.2d 1, 47 Cal. Rptr. 20 
(1965); Jolliffe v. Jolliffe, 10 Va. Law Reg. 1098 (1905); See also A. PHELPS, supra note 5, at 
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quirements for divorce jurisdiction do not apply to it. Separate 
maintenance jurisdiction can exist even though divorce jurisdiction 
does not exist. Thus, the likelihood is great that the J & DR court 
will frequently assume jurisdiction before the circuit court could. 
The amendments entail consequences which become "curiouser 
and curiouser." The transitory nature of the separate maintenance 
action also makes it possible for a court wholly unrelated to di-
vorce jurisdiction to decide the fundamental issues of divorce, fault 
and support. 38 
D. The Authority of the Circuit Court to Extinguish J & DR 
Support Orders Should Be Redefined 
The amendments create another theoretical thicket. Prior to the 
amendments, the circuit court in a subsequent proceeding could 
extinguish any prior J & DR court support order.37 One might as-
sume that the circuit court would have comparable power with re-
spect to J & DR court support orders entered under the new 
amendments. That assumption, however, is questionable. Section 
20-79(a) states in pertinent part: 
In any case where an order has been entered under the provisions of 
this chapter, directing either party to pay any sum or sums of 
money for the support of his or her spouse . . . the jurisdiction of 
the court which entered such order shall cease and its orders become 
inoperative. . . . 38 
Support orders entered under the new amendments will not be or-
ders "entered under the provisions of this chapter," i.e., chapter 
five. They will be orders entered under section 16.1. Section 20-
79(a) only refers to J & DR court support orders entered under 
sections 20-61 through 20-88, the criminal non-support provi-
sions.39 Thus, by negative implication, J & DR court support or-
ders entered under section 16.1 will continue to exist despite a sub-
sequent circuit court award of support. 
§ 12-6. 
36. Any J & DR court could enter a valid separate maintenance award if no objection to 
venue were made. 
37. VA. CoDE ANN. § 20-79(a) (Cum. Supp. 1981). 
38. Id. (emphasis added). 
39. VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 20-61 to -88 (RepL VoL 1975). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
It seems fair to conclude that the ramifications of this recent 
legislation were neither intended nor contemplated. Once the Gen-
eral Assembly appreciates what it has done, it could repeal the 
amendments returning the situation to the status quo ante. If it 
did that, a spouse in J & DR court would have to institute a sepa-
rate circuit court proceeding to obtain civil support."0 On the other 
hand, it could retain the new amendments but enact further legis-· 
lation to alleviate some of their problems. For example, the Legis-
lature could articulate the precise boundaries of J & DR court au-
thority with respect to separate maintenance suits. It could make 
separate maintenance jurisdiction concurrent with circuit court ju-
risdiction. It could amend section 20-79(a) to allow circuit court 
nullification of J & DR court orders entered under section 16.1. 
Even if the Legislature did all that, however, the 1981 amendments 
still would fundamentally affect both the J & DR court and the 
circuit court. If a spouse elected to proceed in J & DR court, that 
court still would have to consider legal issues traditionally reserved 
solely for circuit court determination. So, too, the J & DR court 
determination would continue to bind the circuit court if an appeal 
were not taken. Short of their repeal, nothing can eliminate the 
significant changes wrought by the 1981 amendments. As a final 
alternative, the Legislature could carry to completion what it un-
wittingly began with these amendments. It could give the J & DR 
court original jurisdiction over divorce, annulment and affirmation 
suits thereby making it a true family law court. Creation of one 
court with full responsibility to adjust the domestic relation and 
determine and enforce the rights and liabilities flowing from that 
relation would eliminate many of the problems generated by the 
amendments and the present system in general. It also could abol-
ish de novo review and provide for traditional appellate review. 
The establishment of a true family law court would vastly simplify 
and improve the present situation. Greater access to a court with 
full expertise is a desirable objective. The General Assembly 
should pursue it . . . with vigor and haste. 
40. A spouse could institute criminal non-support proceedings against the other spouse in 
J & DR court under VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-61 through -88 (Cum. Supp. 1981). 

